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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
This case involves a series of troubling events resulting 
in Appellant Dwayne Harvard being arrested and charged with 
six state crimes ranging from reckless endangerment to driving 
under the influence.  Harvard brought an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against the involved police officers in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, violation of his right to Equal Protection, reckless 
investigation, and civil conspiracy.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant police officers, 
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concluding inter alia that no reasonable juror could conclude 
that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Harvard for the 
crimes charged.  We disagree.  We will vacate the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant state trooper 
Christopher Cesnalis as to the false arrest, false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution and Equal Protection claims.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Cesnalis as to the remaining claims.  We will also affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendant state trooper Daniel Beatty on all claims. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A. Factual Background 
 This incident began with an offer of a ride home.  After 
leaving a sports bar in New Kensington, Pennsylvania where 
he had spent two hours watching sports, eating food, and 
drinking two beers, Harvard was flagged down by a stranger, 
Anna Mazzetti, who was standing outside a convenience store.    
Mazzetti asked Harvard for a ride home.  She told Harvard that 
she was afraid of her boyfriend, who had been drinking and 
was physically abusive.  Harvard agreed to give Mazzetti a ride 
home. 
Upon arrival, Mazzetti’s boyfriend, Steven Sutton, 
approached Harvard’s vehicle and began yelling at Mazzetti, 
making threats, and trying to get Mazzetti out of the vehicle.  
Sutton, a White male, used racial slurs against Harvard, a Black 
male.  Sutton attempted to enter Harvard’s vehicle, but the 
doors were locked.  Sutton then proceeded to pick up a cinder 
block and cocked his arm back as if to throw the cinder block 
through the vehicle’s windshield.  Sutton threatened to kill 
both Harvard and Mazzetti multiple times.  Sutton brandished 
a large kitchen knife and told Mazzetti that he would “chop her 
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up.”  App. 57.  He also threatened to shoot Harvard.  Sutton 
then told Harvard to “stay right there” because he “got 
something for [him].”  App. 283.  Sutton then returned to the 
house.   
Believing Sutton to be a threat, Harvard called 911 to 
inform the police of the situation and ask what he should do.  
Harvard, afraid for both his and Mazzetti’s safety, proceeded 
to exit the driveway while Mazzetti was still in the vehicle with 
Harvard.  Sutton re-emerged from the house and jumped onto 
the hood of Harvard’s moving vehicle, a Ford Explorer SUV.  
Harvard slowed his vehicle multiple times to allow Sutton to 
remove himself from the vehicle’s hood.  Rather than remove 
himself, Sutton began pounding on the hood of the vehicle and 
continued to threaten to kill Harvard.  Sutton also continued to 
use racial slurs against Harvard and told Harvard that he would 
kill Harvard as soon as he stopped driving.  Harvard noticed a 
bulge in Sutton’s waistband, which Harvard believed to be a 
firearm.  Sutton was still carrying the large kitchen knife.  
Harvard, still on the phone with 911, informed the operator that 
Sutton was on the hood of the vehicle and was threatening to 
kill him and Mazzetti.  
With Sutton still on the hood, and while still on the 
phone with 911, Harvard drove onto the highway, where he 
drove around or above the speed limit.   Before Harvard entered 
the highway, Sutton discarded his knife.  Once on the highway, 
Sutton ripped the windshield wipers off Harvard’s vehicle. 
Harvard remained on the phone with the 911 operator and 
requested assistance from law enforcement officers.  The 911 
operator instructed Harvard to take a specific exit from the 
highway, where law enforcement officers would be waiting.  
While exiting the highway, Harvard observed Sutton discard 
what he believed to be the firearm hidden in his waistband. 
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Following the 911 operator’s instructions, Harvard 
exited the highway and reached the police roadblock, where 
the officers present had their firearms drawn.  At that point, 
Harvard had traveled approximately ten miles with Sutton on 
the hood of his vehicle.  The officers ordered Sutton to get on 
the ground and ordered Harvard and Mazzetti to exit the 
vehicle with their hands in the air.  Sutton was handcuffed and 
placed into the back of a patrol car. 
Defendant state trooper Cesnalis arrived on the scene 
shortly thereafter.  Prior to arriving, Cesnalis was informed that 
Harvard had been driving on the highway with a man on the 
hood of his vehicle.  Cesnalis was also informed that Harvard 
had contacted 911 and reported that he feared for his safety.  
Cesnalis first interviewed Harvard.  Harvard informed Cesnalis 
of Sutton’s violent and threatening behavior and told Cesnalis 
that he was afraid for his life.  Harvard also said that Sutton 
had been holding a large knife and had continued to reach 
towards his waistband, where Harvard believed Sutton carried 
a firearm.  Cesnalis did not respond to Harvard’s explanation 
and made no effort to locate the knife or the firearm.  
Instead, Cesnalis asked whether Harvard had been 
drinking. Harvard responded that he had consumed two beers 
approximately four hours earlier.  Cesnalis noted that he 
smelled a “moderate” odor of alcohol and that Harvard was 
speaking rapidly and appeared sweaty.  App. 384.  Based on 
these observations, Cesnalis asked Harvard to take a 
Breathalyzer test, to which Harvard agreed.  Harvard initially 
had difficulty completing the test.  During his attempts, 
Cesnalis threatened to handcuff Harvard and said: “You 
understand me boy, I want you to blow into the Breathalyzer.”  
App. 46 (emphasis omitted).  After six tries, Harvard 
completed the Breathalyzer test, which indicated that his blood 
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alcohol content (BAC) was 0.064%, below the legal limit of 
0.08%.  Cesnalis nonetheless inferred that Harvard was under 
the influence of stimulants or narcotics because he was sweaty, 
speaking rapidly, and not directly answering questions. 
Harvard was handcuffed and taken to the police station for 
“safety reasons.”  App. 46.  
Cesnalis interviewed Sutton next.  At the time of the 
interview, Cesnalis was aware that Sutton had a criminal 
record and had prior encounters with the police.  Sutton told 
Cesnalis that Harvard had hit him with a Ford Explorer SUV 
and that Sutton had then landed on the hood of the SUV.  
Cesnalis did not think Sutton’s explanation for how he ended 
up on top of the SUV after being hit made sense.  Cesnalis also 
did not observe any injuries to Sutton which would indicate 
that he had just been hit by an SUV.  Nonetheless, Cesnalis did 
not ask any follow up questions to probe Sutton’s explanation.  
Despite his incredible statement and Harvard’s account of the 
incident, Sutton was not arrested or charged with any crimes. 
 Cesnalis then interviewed Mazzetti.  Prior to 
interviewing Mazzetti, Cesnalis testified that he had already 
decided to arrest Harvard.  Mazzetti corroborated Harvard’s 
statements regarding Sutton’s threatening and violent 
behavior.  Specifically, Mazzetti told Cesnalis that Sutton was 
“crazy” and had threatened to throw a cinder block through the 
windshield.  App. 423.  She also said that she was afraid to get 
out of the vehicle and that Harvard slowed his vehicle to give 
Sutton the opportunity to remove himself from the hood, but 
Sutton refused to do so.  She also “tried to tell [the officers] 
about the butcher’s knife” and stated that Sutton was drunk and 
currently on probation.  App. 258. 
Cesnalis arrested Harvard and transported him to the 
police station for further investigation.  Harvard again tried to 
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explain that Sutton had a weapon and had been threatening 
Harvard and Mazzetti, but Cesnalis ignored these statements.  
Cesnalis then informed defendant state trooper Daniel Beatty, 
a Drug Recognition Expert, that Harvard had driven with a man 
on the hood of his vehicle.  Cesnalis also told Beatty that 
Harvard had “admitted to drinking several beers” and that 
Harvard was “very talkative and sweaty.”  App. 540.  Cesnalis 
further informed Beatty that Sutton had witnessed Harvard 
smoking crack cocaine while driving.  No evidence supports 
this accusation. 
Based on the information Cesnalis provided, Beatty ran 
a series of tests to determine whether Harvard was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol.  Harvard’s BAC at the time of 
the examination was 0.051%.  Beatty completed a Drug 
Recognition Evaluation (DRE), in which he reported that 
Harvard was cooperative, his coordination seemed poor, his 
face was sweaty, he was very talkative, his eyes were bloodshot 
and watery, his pulse was substantially higher than normal, and 
there was a lack of smooth pursuit during the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus. Beatty detected no distinct odors.  Beatty’s DRE 
concluded that Harvard was “under the influence of CNS 
Depressants and CNS Stimulants,” which “impaired his ability 
to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle.”  App. 545-46.  Beatty requested that Harvard 
consent to a blood test, to which Harvard agreed.  The blood 
test later returned negative results for all tested drugs and 
indicated that Harvard’s BAC was 0.016%. 
Cesnalis filed an affidavit of probable cause with the 
magistrate judge, charging Harvard with: (1) recklessly 
endangering another person (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705); (2) 
reckless driving (75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3736(a)); (3) simple 
assault (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(3)); (4) aggravated assault 
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(18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1)); (5) disorderly conduct (18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503(a)(4)); and (6) driving under the 
influence of a controlled substance (75 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3802(d)(2)).1  In the affidavit, Cesnalis referred to Sutton as 
“the victim” and entirely credited Sutton’s version of events.  
For example, Cesnalis indicated that Harvard hit Sutton with 
his vehicle; Sutton landed on the hood of the vehicle; and 
Harvard continued driving and refused to stop, leaving Sutton 
“hanging onto the hood of the vehicle for his life” until Harvard 
 
1 A person is guilty of recklessly endangering another person 
if he “recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place 
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705.   
A person is guilty of reckless driving if he “drives any vehicle 
in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property.” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3736(a).   
A person is guilty of simple assault if he “attempts by physical 
menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(3).  
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause 
serious bodily injury to another.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
2702(a)(1).   
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he “creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which 
serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5503(a)(4). 
A person is guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol or 
a controlled substance if he was “under the influence of a drug 
or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the 
individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual 
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.”  75 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3802(d)(2).  
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was eventually stopped by local police officers.  App. 133.  
Cesnalis indicated that he believed Sutton’s version of events 
because of Harvard’s “reputation for criminal activity,” App. 
132, despite there being no evidence that Harvard has a 
criminal background.  Cesnalis also omitted several 
exculpatory facts from the affidavit.  For example, Cesnalis did 
not include that Harvard initiated the 911 call because he feared 
for his safety or that he followed the 911 operator’s 
instructions, which guided him to the police blockade.  Further, 
he did not include statements from either Harvard or Mazzetti 
indicating that Sutton was violent and aggressive, that Sutton 
had a weapon, that Sutton threatened to kill them, or that 
Harvard slowed down his vehicle to allow Sutton to get off the 
hood, which Sutton refused to do.  Cesnalis also failed to note 
that Harvard completed a Breathalyzer test and his BAC was 
below the legal limit. 
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge 
dismissed the DUI charge.  A bench trial was held on the 
remaining charges and Harvard was found not guilty on all 
charges.  
B. Procedural History 
Harvard brought a § 1983 claim against Cesnalis and 
Beatty alleging: false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, violation of the Equal Protection clause, reckless 
investigation, and civil conspiracy to deprive him of his rights 
under the Fourth Amendment.2  The defendants filed a motion 
for summary judgment, arguing that Harvard failed to assert 
any viable claims under § 1983. 
 
 
2 Harvard also asserted various state law claims, but later 
withdrew them at summary judgment.   
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The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on all claims.  For the false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims, the District 
Court concluded that no reasonable juror could find probable 
cause lacking.  For the Equal Protection claim, the District 
Court ruled that Harvard failed to identify a similarly situated 
person who was treated differently because of race.  For the 
reckless investigation claim, the District Court determined that 
our Circuit has never recognized such a claim under § 1983, 
and even if such a claim were recognized in this case, the 
officers would be entitled to qualified immunity.  For the civil 
conspiracy claim, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants because there was no underlying 
violation of Harvard’s constitutional rights, based on its 
assessment of the other claims.  This appeal followed.  
 
II JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review of a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We may affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  When assessing a summary judgment 
ruling, we must view all facts “in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, who is ‘entitled to every reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from the record.’” Reedy, 615 F.3d 
at 210 (quoting Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 
782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)).  We may only affirm a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment if “the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to [the nonmoving party], reasonably would not 
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support a contrary factual finding.”  Dempsey v. Bucknell 
Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Harvard challenges the District Court’s Order granting 
summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.  Harvard 
argues that his claims should have proceeded to trial because 
the defendants led a racially biased investigation against him; 
arrested, imprisoned, and charged him without probable cause; 
and conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights.  We 
will address each claim in turn. 
 A. False Arrest 
To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must 
establish “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest 
was made without probable cause.”  James v. City of Wilkes-
Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012).  The parties agree that 
Cesnalis arrested Harvard at the scene but disagree on whether 
Cesnalis had probable cause to arrest him.  False arrest and 
false imprisonment claims will “necessarily fail if probable 
cause existed for any one of the crimes charged against the 
arrestee.”  Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 477.  Thus, summary 
judgment for false arrest and false imprisonment is proper only 
if no reasonable juror could find a lack of probable cause for 
any of the charged crimes.3  We must therefore assess the 
requirements for all of the crimes charged to determine 
 
3 For malicious prosecution, probable cause on one charge 
“does not foreclose a malicious prosecution cause of action” as 
to a separate charge which lacks probable cause.  Johnson v. 
Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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whether any reasonable juror could find that Cesnalis lacked 
probable cause to arrest Harvard.  Harvard was arrested for six 
separate crimes and, as we outlined in footnote 1, supra, each 
of the six crimes has a different requisite mental state.  We will 
therefore assess whether any reasonable juror could find that 
Harvard lacked the requisite mental state for each of the crimes 
charged.   
“Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that 
the person committed the crime at issue.”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 
F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  An officer has 
probable cause to arrest a person “when the facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the 
person to be arrested.”  Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 
480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).  In determining probable cause, 
arresting officers must consider plainly exculpatory evidence 
in addition to inculpatory evidence.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790.  
This is true “even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing 
by itself) suggests that probable cause exists.”  Id. (quoting 
Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999)).   
Because we are evaluating probable cause at the 
summary judgment stage, we must assess probable cause based 
upon the “totality-of-the-circumstances” available to the 
arresting officer and view those circumstances in the light most 
favorable to Harvard.  Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467-68 (citation 
omitted).  As part of this assessment, we must determine 
whether the plainly exculpatory evidence available to the 
arresting officer “outweighs the probable cause otherwise 
established” through inculpatory evidence.  Id. at 478, 490 
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).  
This totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry is “necessarily fact-
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intensive” and thus “it will usually be appropriate for a jury to 
determine whether probable cause existed.”  Id. at 468; see also 
Merkle, 211 F.3d at 788 (“Generally, the question 
of probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the 
jury.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  We 
undertake our analysis on a crime-by-crime basis. 
First, a person is guilty of recklessly endangering 
another person if he “recklessly engages in conduct which 
places or may place another person in danger of death or 
serious bodily injury.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705.  Driving with 
a man on the hood of a vehicle undoubtedly places the person 
on the hood in danger of serious bodily injury.  Thus, the actus 
reus requirement for reckless endangerment is satisfied, as no 
reasonable juror could find otherwise.  But we are not so sure 
for the mens rea requirement, namely, whether Harvard acted 
recklessly in light of the totality of the circumstances.   
Under Pennsylvania law, a person acts recklessly when 
he “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk.”  
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(b)(3).  Viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to Harvard, a reasonable juror could find that 
Harvard acted as a good Samaritan by agreeing to give 
Mazzetti—standing alone and afraid of her boyfriend, 
Sutton—a ride home.  Once Sutton emerged from the house, 
aggressive, violent, and threatening, and then jumped onto the 
hood of his vehicle, a juror could find that Harvard’s decision 
to drive with Sutton on the hood of his vehicle was a justifiable 
risk to protect himself and Mazzetti from Sutton’s abhorrent 
behavior.  This is particularly true because Harvard slowed his 
vehicle multiple times to allow Sutton to remove himself from 
the hood, but Sutton refused to do so and instead pounded on 
the hood of the vehicle and threatened to kill Harvard and 
Mazzetti as soon as Harvard stopped driving.  Moreover, 
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Harvard contacted 911 for help and followed the 911 
operator’s instructions throughout the entire incident.  We 
therefore conclude that, viewing all of the facts in the light 
most favorable to Harvard, a reasonable juror could find that 
Harvard was not consciously disregarding an unjustifiable risk 
and could find a lack of probable cause for the crime of 
recklessly endangering another person. 
Second, a person is guilty of reckless driving if he 
“drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety 
of persons or property.”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3736(a).  “Willful 
or wanton” within the context of reckless driving “means the 
driver grossly deviates from ordinary prudence and creates a 
substantial risk of injury.”  Commonwealth v. Carroll, 936 
A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis omitted), 
abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 
A.2d 505 (Pa. 2005).  Like the crime of reckless endangerment, 
a juror could find that Harvard’s decision to drive with Sutton 
on the hood of his vehicle did not demonstrate a callous 
disregard for Sutton’s life, but rather, was a justifiable risk to 
protect himself and Mazzetti.  
Third, a person is guilty of simple assault if he “attempts 
by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious 
bodily injury.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(3). Considering 
the exculpatory facts, a reasonable juror could find that 
Harvard did not intend to put Sutton in fear of serious bodily 
injury.  In fact, the evidence suggests that Harvard attempted 
to de-escalate the situation to avoid causing harm to Sutton.  
For example, after Sutton jumped onto the hood, Harvard 
slowed his vehicle multiple times and asked Sutton to remove 
himself from the hood, yet Sutton refused.  Further, Sutton, not 
Harvard, continued his aggressive and threatening behavior 
towards Harvard and Mazzetti.  Also, Harvard followed the 
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911 operator’s instructions to get off the highway at a particular 
exit, where law enforcement would be waiting.  Accordingly, 
a reasonable juror could find that Harvard did not have the 
requisite intent for simple assault. 
Fourth, a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he 
“attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another.”  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1).  Because a reasonable juror could find 
a lack of probable cause for simple assault, we similarly find 
that a reasonable juror could find a lack of probable cause for 
the more serious crime of aggravated assault. 
Fifth, a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he acts 
“with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof”  and “creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which 
serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5503(a)(4).  As discussed for the above crimes, a juror could 
find that the evidence available to Cesnalis showed that 
Harvard drove with Sutton on the hood of his vehicle because 
he feared for the safety of himself and Mazzetti, not because 
he intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm.  Accordingly, we conclude that a reasonable juror could 
find that there was no probable cause for disorderly conduct. 
Finally, sixth, a person is guilty of driving under the 
influence if he was “under the influence of a drug or 
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the 
individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual 
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.”  75 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3802(d)(2).  For the DUI charge, Cesnalis determined 
there was probable cause to arrest Harvard because he smelled 
alcohol on Harvard’s breath and because Harvard was sweaty 
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and speaking rapidly.4  Although we must consider these 
observations as part of our probable cause inquiry, we must 
consider them in the light most favorable to Harvard.  See 
Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468.  Here, a juror could find that a 
reasonable officer would have interpreted Harvard’s sweaty 
appearance and rapid speech as a natural reaction to the 
traumatic events he had just experienced.  Indeed, Cesnalis 
testified during his deposition that Harvard’s rapid speech and 
sweaty appearance was likely a result of this recent trauma.  
Further, although Cesnalis smelled a moderate amount of 
alcohol on Harvard’s breath, Harvard informed Cesnalis that 
he had consumed two beers four hours before the incident, 
which is consistent with the results of the Breathalyzer test 
indicating that his BAC was below the legal limit.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, a person’s BAC need not be above the legal 
limit for a DUI charge, however, we note that Cesnalis could 
observe that Harvard was a large man.  Standing 5 feet 10 
inches tall and weighing 345 pounds at the time of arrest, a 
juror could find that it was unreasonable for Cesnalis to believe 
that two beers consumed four hours beforehand could render 
Harvard incapable of safely operating his vehicle.  
Based on the information Cesnalis knew at the time of 
arrest and the horrific events Harvard had just experienced, a 
juror could find that Cesnalis did not have probable cause to 
arrest Harvard for DUI.  Thus, we conclude that the District 
 
4 Cesnalis arrested Harvard before Beatty conducted the DRE, 
and therefore the information within Beatty’s report cannot be 
considered in evaluating the false arrest claim.  See Hunter v. 
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (holding that probable cause 
is assessed in relation to the facts possessed by the arresting 
officer at the time he made the warrantless arrest).  
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Court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that Cesnalis 
had probable cause to arrest Harvard for the crime of DUI. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to the false arrest claim.5 
B. False Imprisonment 
“[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an 
arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false 
imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”  
Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 
1995).  “To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff 
must establish: (1) that [he] was detained; and (2) that the 
detention was unlawful.”  James, 700 F.3d at 682-83.  Like his 
arrest, Harvard argues that he was imprisoned without probable 
cause.  Specifically, Harvard alleges that he was unlawfully 
detained at the police barracks, where defendant Beatty 
required him to undergo a series of tests, and was later 
transported to the Allegheny County Jail, where he was 
imprisoned.  
Our probable cause analysis for false imprisonment is 
largely the same as our probable cause analysis for false arrest.  
Because a juror could find that Cesnalis lacked probable cause 
to arrest Harvard, it follows that a juror could “find that 
[Harvard] suffered a violation of his constitutional rights by 
virtue of his detention pursuant to that arrest.”  Groman, 47 
F.3d at 636.  The only addition to our probable cause inquiry 
under false imprisonment is Beatty’s drug evaluation.  Beatty 
conducted a DRE, in which he concluded that Harvard was 
 
5 Because Beatty was not involved in Harvard’s arrest, we will 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for 
Beatty on the false arrest claim. 
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“under the influence of CNS Depressants and CNS 
Stimulants,” which “impaired his ability to safely drive, 
operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.”  
App. 545-46.  Although this could be enough to support 
probable cause on a DUI charge, his evaluation relied on 
erroneous and incomplete information provided by Cesnalis.  
Cesnalis informed Beatty that Harvard had driven on the 
highway with a man on the hood of his vehicle but did not 
provide any other context for Harvard’s actions, including 
Sutton’s alleged threatening and violent behavior.  Further, 
Cesnalis told Beatty that Sutton saw Harvard smoking crack 
cocaine while driving, a fact unsupported anywhere else in the 
record.  Beatty then relied on this unverified, incomplete 
information from an unreliable source to draw inferences about 
Harvard’s potential drug use.  Because Beatty’s DRE was 
based on incomplete and potentially falsified information, a 
juror could find that the DRE was unreliable and therefore 
should not be considered in determining probable cause.  Thus, 
we will not consider Beatty’s evaluation as part of our probable 
cause inquiry for false imprisonment and conclude that a juror 
could find that Cesnalis unlawfully detained Harvard.   
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to the false imprisonment 
claim.  We will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Beatty on the false imprisonment claim because 
his DRE, and thus his role in the detention, was based on 
Cesnalis’s incomplete and potentially falsified information. 
C. Malicious Prosecution 
To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that: “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal 
proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the] 
plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without 
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probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a 
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the 
plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the 
concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal 
proceeding.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 
(3d Cir. 2003).  Harvard argues that the defendants unlawfully 
initiated criminal proceedings against him by “knowingly 
providing false and misleading evidence to prosecuting 
authorities.”  Appellant Br. 30.  The defendants argue that the 
malicious prosecution claim fails because the criminal 
proceedings were initiated with probable cause.  We will 
address each requirement in turn. 
For the first prong, Cesnalis initiated a criminal 
proceeding against Harvard when he arrested Harvard without 
a warrant and then submitted an affidavit of probable cause to 
the magistrate judge as part of the criminal complaint charging 
Harvard with six different crimes.  See Pa. R. Crim. Pro. 502.  
In his affidavit, Cesnalis requested that Harvard “come before 
[the magistrate judge’s] court to answer to the [] charges.”  
App. 133.  Second, these proceedings ended in Harvard’s 
favor.  The DUI charge was dismissed after the preliminary 
hearing, and Harvard was found not guilty on the remaining 
charges.  Third, a reasonable juror could find that there was a 
lack of probable cause for the criminal proceedings initiated 
against Harvard.  We reach this conclusion for the same 
reasons discussed above in our probable cause inquiry for false 
arrest and false imprisonment. 
Fourth, we must determine whether a reasonable juror 
could, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Harvard, 
find that the defendants acted with malice or for a purpose 
other than bringing Harvard to justice.  Considering Cesnalis’s 
behavior, the answer is yes.  Cesnalis mischaracterized the 
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events and chose to omit crucial exculpatory information in the 
affidavit of probable cause he submitted to the magistrate 
judge. 6  In the affidavit, Cesnalis consistently referred to 
 
6 In the affidavit, Cesnalis described the incident as follows:  
 
This incident occurred at 756 McKinley St 
Harwick PA, Springdale Twp Allegheny County 
when the victim related that his girlfriend and the 
DEFENDANT were in his 2002 Ford Explorer 
already driving through the yard at 756 
McKinley. The VICTIM related that he ran out 
into the yard in front of the vehicle and that is 
when the DEFENDANT hit the VICTIM with 
his vehicle. The VICITM [sic] then landed onto 
the hood of the vehicle and the DEFENDANT 
continued to drive through the yard. The 
VICTIM then stated that he was hanging onto the 
hood of the vehicle for his life because the 
DEFENDANT wouldn’t stop the vehicle. The 
DEFENDANT then drove through Springdale 
Twp into Harmar Twp down towards the river 
and got onto Freeport Rd and continued South on 
Freeport Rd through HARMAR Twp and made 
a right onto SR 910 and traveled onto Exit 11 on 
Ramp to travel North on SR 28. Then 
DEFENDANT then begin to travel at a high rate 
of speed on SR 28 as the victim was holding on 
for dear life and that is when the windshield 
wipers were ripped off the vehicle. The 
DEFENDANT drove North on SR 28 through 
Harmar Twp, Springdale Twp, Frazer Twp, East 
Deer Twp, Tarentum Borough, Fawn Twp, into 
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Sutton as “the victim” and entirely credited Sutton’s 
statements.  Cesnalis did not mention any of the credibility 
issues with Sutton’s version of events, namely, that he knew 
Sutton had a criminal history, that Sutton had no visible 
injuries, or that his version of events was incredible on its face.  
Moreover, Cesnalis indicated that he believed Sutton’s 
statement because of Harvard’s “reputation for criminal 
activity,” even though there is no evidence in the record to 
support this accusation.  App. 132.  Cesnalis also 
misrepresented the facts to make it seem as though Harvard 
had to be stopped by law enforcement, despite knowing that 
Harvard called 911 because he feared for his safety and that 
 
Harrsion Twp where the DEFENDANT was 
stopped by local police. That is when the 
VICTIM got off the vehicle and was placed into 
the rear of a Harrison Twp police vehicle and the 
DEFENDANT was standing on Burtner Rd upon 
my arrival.  
 
After the DEFENDANT was on station Trooper 
Daniel BEATTY performed a DRE evaluation 
which determined that the DEFENDANT was 
under the influence of a controlled substance.  
It is this affiant’s opinion that the defendant, 
Dwayne Milton HARVARD was under the 
influence of an [sic] controlled substance and 
due to the fact that the DEFENDANT did travel 
on the SR 28 with the VICITM [sic] on his hood 
of vehicle. Therefore, I request that the defendant 
come before your court to answer to the 
following charges being brought against him. 
App. 133. 
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Harvard followed the 911 operator’s instructions to get off the 
highway at a particular exit where police would be waiting.  
Furthermore, Cesnalis did not include any relevant exculpatory 
facts, including Harvard and Mazzetti’s consistent statements 
that Sutton was violent and aggressive and threatened them 
with a cinderblock and knife, or that Harvard slowed his 
vehicle multiple times in order to allow Sutton to remove 
himself from the hood.  Cesnalis also omitted any reference to 
the results of Harvard’s Breathalyzer tests.  
A juror could find that Cesnalis omitted crucial 
information from the affidavit and misrepresented the facts in 
order to portray Sutton as the victim and Harvard as the 
criminal.  A juror could further find that no reasonable officer 
would omit such crucial information, which, as discussed 
above, creates serious doubts as to whether Harvard had the 
requisite mental state for the crimes charged.  Cesnalis has 
offered no explanation for why he chose to credit Sutton’s 
statements over Harvard and Mazzetti’s statements, and we can 
think of no valid reason for why Cesnalis would include such 
grave misrepresentations and falsehoods in the affidavit.  For 
these reasons, we conclude that a juror could find that Cesnalis 
initiated proceedings against Harvard maliciously or for a 
reason other than bringing him to justice. 
Finally, for the fifth prong, Harvard was detained in 
Allegheny County Jail, and therefore suffered “post-indictment 
restrictions placed on [Harvard’s] liberty [that] constituted a 
seizure.”  Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 380 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to the malicious 
prosecution claim.7 
D. Equal Protection  
 
Harvard argues that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for the defendants on his Equal Protection 
claim.  Harvard brings a selective enforcement claim, 
contending that he was treated differently because of his race.  
Specifically, Harvard asserts that Sutton, a White male, was 
not arrested or charged with any crimes despite his violent and 
aggressive behavior and yet Harvard, a Black male, was 
unlawfully arrested, imprisoned, and charged despite being the 
victim of Sutton’s unlawful behavior. 
To establish a selective enforcement claim under the 
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that he was (1) treated differently 
from other, similarly situated persons and (2) “that this 
selective treatment was based on an unjustifiable standard, 
such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor or to 
prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.”  Jewish Home of 
E. Pa. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 693 F.3d 359, 
363 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 
citation omitted).  Persons are similarly situated under the 
Equal Protection clause when they are alike “in all relevant 
respects.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).  
Notably, we have held that “similarly situated” does not mean 
 
7 We will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Beatty as to the malicious prosecution claim 
because Harvard has not established that Beatty participated in 
initiating criminal proceedings against him or that Beatty acted 
with the requisite intent.  
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“identically situated.”  Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 
154, 178 (3d Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1993).  Our 
sister circuits have also emphasized that courts conducting the 
“similarly situated” inquiry “should not demand exact 
correlation, but should instead seek relevant similarity.”  
Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 212 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation 
omitted); see also Barrington Cove Ltd. P’ship v. R.I. Hous. & 
Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Exact 
correlation is neither likely nor necessary, but the cases must 
be fair congeners.”).   
The District Court held that Harvard failed to identify a 
similarly situated person because he cannot “point to any 
caucasian drivers who drove at highway speeds with someone 
on the hood of the vehicle, but were not charged with crimes.”  
App. 12.  We find this definition of “similarly situated” overly 
restrictive.  The District Court’s application of “similarly 
situated” essentially requires that the comparator be identically 
situated to Harvard for the Equal Protection claim to succeed.  
We have previously rejected this requirement and do so again 
here.  See Bennun, 941 F.2d at 178.  
Requiring a valid comparator to have taken the exact 
same actions as the plaintiff would effectively bar equal 
protection claims in unique situations such as this.  Cesnalis 
noted that he had never encountered such a strange situation 
during his time as a police officer, and we note that it would be 
almost impossible for a plaintiff to identify an identically 
situated person in a situation such as this.  Instead, we must re-
frame the question not as whether the two individuals’ actions 
were identical, but whether a juror, “looking objectively at the 
incidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the 
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protagonists similarly situated.”  Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 
8.   
Here, Harvard and Sutton’s actions occurred during the 
same incident and could therefore be easily compared side-by-
side.  Indeed, Cesnalis had the opportunity to do just that when 
he interviewed Harvard and Sutton at the same time in the same 
location.  Cesnalis also had evidence that both Sutton and 
Harvard engaged in behavior that threatened the safety of 
another person.  At a minimum, Harvard and Sutton each 
alleged that the other person was engaged in violent behavior 
and wielded dangerous weapons:   Harvard alleged that Sutton 
attempted to throw a cinder block towards him, jumped onto 
Harvard’s vehicle while holding a large kitchen knife and 
threatened to kill him, and possessed a firearm; and Sutton 
alleged that Harvard struck him with his vehicle.  Viewing 
Sutton and Harvard as two persons who engaged in allegedly 
threatening and violent behavior with a dangerous weapon, 
whose actions occurred during the same incident, and whose 
actions (if true) could potentially give rise to similar criminal 
charges, we find that a reasonable juror could determine they 
are similarly situated.   
A juror could also find that there was no rational basis 
for disparate treatment towards Harvard except upon the basis 
of Harvard’s race.  Cesnalis chose to ignore overwhelming 
evidence that Sutton was the aggressor who acted unlawfully 
in this situation and decided to credit Sutton’s incredible 
statements.  According to Harvard, Cesnalis repeatedly 
referred to Harvard as “boy” while demanding that Harvard 
complete a Breathalyzer test.  App. 46 (“You understand me 
boy, I want you to blow into the Breathalyzer.” (emphasis 
omitted)).  Harvard was 46 years old at the time of the incident.  
Because of the long history of “boy” as a slur against Black 
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men, a juror could, under the circumstances, interpret this term 
as evidence of racial animus.  See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (noting that use of the term “boy” 
was a potential indicator of racial animus).  Cesnalis also 
insinuated that Harvard had been smoking crack cocaine even 
though there is no evidence whatsoever in the record to support 
this accusation.  A juror could find that this is further evidence 
of racial animus based on the historical associations of crack 
cocaine use with Black communities.  See Richard Dvorak, 
Cracking the Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs During the 
Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
611, 648 (2000) (discussing how this association with Black 
communities contributed to the controversial federal crack 
cocaine legislation of the 1980s).  This underlying racial 
animus is further corroborated by Cesnalis’s affidavit of 
probable cause, in which he consistently referred to Sutton as 
“the victim.”  Cesnalis’s deliberate omissions from the 
affidavit and potentially falsified information suggesting that 
Harvard had a prior criminal history all lend support to 
Harvard’s allegation that Cesnalis’s actions were motivated by 
a prohibited reason, in this case, racial animus. 
A juror could find that Cesnalis’s racial slurs against 
Harvard, combined with his unreasonable decision to credit 
Sutton’s testimony and omit vital exculpatory facts from the 
affidavit, indicate that Cesnalis’s actions were racially 
motivated.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to Harvard’s Equal 
Protection claim.8 
 
8 Harvard has not demonstrated that Beatty was involved in this 
disparate treatment.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s 
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 E. Reckless Investigation 
Harvard argues that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for the defendants on the reckless 
investigation claim.  Harvard asserts that his rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment were violated because the officers 
intentionally chose not to investigate Sutton’s violent attack 
against Harvard.  
We have never recognized an independent due process 
right to be free from a reckless investigation.  See Geness v. 
Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 354 n.5 (3d Cir. 2018) (expressing “doubts” 
as to the viability of a reckless investigation claim).  We have 
also held that, even if such a claim were cognizable, it “could 
only arise under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants as to the reckless investigation 
claim.9  
F. Civil Conspiracy 
 
grant of summary judgment for Beatty on the Equal Protection 
claim.  
9 Even if Harvard had brought the reckless investigation claim 
under the Fourth Amendment, the officers would nevertheless 
be entitled to qualified immunity because this right was not 
clearly established at the time of the investigation.  See id. 
(“Whatever doubts we may harbor as to the viability of such a 
[reckless investigation] claim, however, we have no occasion 
to resolve them today.  First, no such constitutional right was 
‘clearly established’ at the relevant time, as required to 
overcome qualified immunity.” (citations omitted)). 
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Harvard argues that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for the defendants for his civil conspiracy 
claim.  “To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a 
plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state law 
reached an understanding to deprive him of his constitutional 
rights.”  Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 
293-94 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  This requires that the state actors took “concerted 
action” based on an “agreement” to deprive the plaintiff of his 
constitutional rights, and that there was an actual underlying 
constitutional violation of the plaintiff’s rights.  Id. at 295. 
The District Court granted summary judgment because 
it determined there was no underlying violation of Harvard’s 
constitutional rights.  Although we conclude that a jury could 
determine that Harvard’s constitutional rights were violated, 
Harvard has not demonstrated that Cesnalis and Beatty agreed 
to deprive him of his constitutional rights.  According to 
Harvard, Cesnalis’s suspicion that Harvard was under the 
influence led Beatty to subject Harvard to a series of tests to 
confirm that suspicion.  But, as discussed above, Beatty’s 
involvement in this case was limited to performing the DRE 
and his evaluation was based on inaccurate and incomplete 
information supplied by Cesnalis.  There is no indication that 
Beatty knew about Cesnalis’s misrepresentations or that he 
entered into an understanding with Cesnalis to falsely conclude 
that Harvard was under the influence.10  Accordingly, we will 
 
10 Harvard also argues that Beatty furthered the conspiracy 
when he “contrived a story” that Mazzetti was a prostitute and 
that she was trying to steal Harvard’s money.  Appellant Br. 
35.  Even if Beatty did fabricate this story, this took place after 
Harvard’s criminal case was terminated and the charges were 
dismissed.  Therefore, it does not support Harvard’s claim that 
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affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants as to the civil conspiracy claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to the false 
arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and Equal 
Protection claims.  We will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment for Cesnalis on the reckless investigation 
and civil conspiracy claims.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment for Beatty on all claims. 
 
Cesnalis and Beatty conspired to deprive him of his 
constitutional rights. 
